To the magnificent Lorenzo, son of Piero de’ Medici…

It is the custom of those trying to find favor in the eyes of a prince to present him with such things as they value most highly or in which they see him take delight. Consequently, men make offerings of horses, arms, golden cloth, precious stones, and such ornaments. These things are worthy of the greatness of the Prince. Although I want to present myself to Your Magnificence with some token of my eagerness to serve you, I have been unable to find anything that I own which I hold more dear than the knowledge I have of the actions of great men. I have come to this knowledge through a long experience in present-day affairs and a continual study of ancient history. Having thought long and diligently on this knowledge, and having tested it well, I have reduced all that I know to this little book which I now send to your Magnificence. Even though I consider this work unworthy of your presence, I nevertheless hope that you may find it acceptable in your kindness. I have no better gift to offer you than to give you the possibility to learn in a very short space of time all that I have come to know over many years through many risks and hardships. I have not adorned this work, nor inflated it with lengthy phrases nor pompous or magnificent words. I have also not added any other refinement or unnecessary ornamentation the way that most writers pump up their work. I wrote simply because it is my wish that no special honor should be given the simple truth, and because I feel that the gravity of the subject will make it acceptable.

I hope it will not be considered presumptuous if a man of low and humble condition such as myself dare to discuss and lay down rules for the government of the princes. For, just as a landscape painter stands in the plains to survey the nature of mountains and hills, and then stands in the hills to survey the lowlands, a Prince must act similarly. To know the nature of peoples well, one must be a prince. Similarly, to know princes, one must be of the people. I hope that Your Magnificence will be pleased to accept this little gift in the same spirit in which I send it. If Your Magnificence reads and carefully studies these pages, they will show my heartfelt desire that you attain that summit of greatness which fortune and your other qualities promise you. And, if from the peak of the mountain Your Magnificence may be willing some time to look down upon these humble places below, you will know how undeservedly I suffer from a great and continuous bout of bad luck.

Chapter 1

Types of Monarchy and How They are Acquired

All states or territories, past or present, that have held authority over men, are or have been either monarchies or republics. Monarchies may be either hereditary (having had for many years a succession of rulers from the same family) or new. New monarchies may be entirely new, as in Milan with Francesco Sforza. On the other hand, monarchies may be pieces of land added to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain. Acquired kingdoms either have been used to life under another prince, or have been free. The acquired possessions have been gotten by the new prince either by force of his own armies, by the force of another man’s armies, by fortune, or because of his character and ability.

Chapter 2

Hereditary Monarchies

I shall skip discussion of republics as I have discussed them fully in another book. I shall concern myself here only with monarchies. Following the classification set forth in the previous chapter, I will discuss how monarchies may be governed and preserved.

Hereditary states, which are used to the rule of the family line of their prince, are much more easily maintained than new ones. This is true because it is usually enough for the prince not to violate the customs of his predecessors and also to deal with emergencies as they arise. Thus, if such a prince behaves in even an average manner, he will always keep his state. He will only lose it if some extraordinary and excessive force takes it from him. And even if he loses it, the slightest misfortune of the new ruler will be enough to give it back to the man who lost it. We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara. He could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, nor those of Pope Julius in 1510, unless he had been well established for a long time. Since a long-established prince is not pressured by his people, and since he doesn’t need to pressure them, it is logical that he should be loved. As long as exceptional vices do not make him hated, it is reasonable that the prince’s subjects will remain loyal to him and happy with him. Essentially, a long rule become a habit hard to break, whereas a freshly started kingdom often lays the groundwork for yet another new kingdom.

Chapter 3

Mixed Monarchies

It is in the new monarchies that difficulties are found. First, if the new monarchy is not entirely new, but is mixed into a larger kingdom, disorders arise. The difficulty comes up naturally because men like to change masters, hoping to find one who will improve their lives. This means that the people will take up arms against their rulers, on will only later realize that they have worsened their lives by trading rulers. The revolt springs from an equally simple and natural cause: it is inevitable for a new prince to make his subjects mad. When a prince takes over a new land, his soldiers invariable cause trouble, and he must injure some people to take over the land. As a result, the prince has invariably made enemies by conquering a new land. Adding to a prince’s problems, he cannot keep the loyalty of his allies, since the prince can never give them the spoils of struggle for which they hoped. Since these people helped the prince, he cannot use strong measures against them because he relies upon them. However strong a prince’s army may be, he always needs the good will of the province to enter into a province. For these reasons, Louis XII, King of France, occupied Milan in a very short space of time and then quickly lost it. Getting rid of Louis XII the first time was easy and needed only Lodovico's own forces. This is because those who had opened the gates to Louis XII turned on him when he did not help them as they had expected. When, by some chance, a kingdom rebels and is recaptured, the prince will usually have less trouble holding the land. This is because the prince will now have the justification of the rebellion for taking very harsh measures. He can assure his safety by punishing the rebels, unmasking the plotters, and fortifying his weak spots. Thus, Milan was recaptured from Louis XII easily the first time. All Duke Lodovico had to do was to revolt on the borders of the state. However, once Louis XII recaptured Milan, it was necessary to bring the whole world against him to retake the city yet again. Indeed, Louis XII’s armies had to be defeated and driven out of Italy. Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons why Louis XII lost the city the first time have been discussed. Why Louis XII lost the city the second time remains to be explained. We need to see what resources he had, and how any one in his situation could have kept Milan more securely than did the King of France.

I would like to point out here that those states which are joined into the larger hereditary kingdom of their conqueror are either of the same culture or language or they are not. When they are similar, it is very simple to keep them, especially when they have not been used to free government. The only requirement for holding these new possessions is that the family line that used to govern them be dead. Basically, since the customs and lifestyles of the conquered people will not change, they will grow accustomed quickly to the new situation. This situation can be seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have so long been attached to France. Though their are some language differences amongst them, their customs are similar enough that they get on well together. Still, a prince who wishes to take over a similar territory must keep two things in mind: he must be certain that the conquered land’s possible princes are all dead, and he must make sure not to change the laws or taxes of his new subjects. If the prince does this, in a short time the new land will become completely identified with his hereditary principality. However, when possessions are acquired in a province differing in language, customs, and laws, there are going to be difficulties. It takes good luck and energy to keep these sorts of lands. One of the best and most effective means to hold these lands would be for the prince who conquers them to go and live in them. This will make his possession of them more secure and enduring. A good example of this is the case of the Turkish Sultan in Greece. Despite the fact that the Sultan took many measures to hold Greece, if he had not settled there he would not have been able to keep it. For, being on the spot, one can see disorders as they come up and can quickly deal with them. But, from a distance, a prince usually hears of problems only once they are serious, once it is often too late to fix things. Further, when the prince lives there, his subordinates do not rob the inhabitants and the new subjects can appeal directly to the prince when they have problems. Consequently, if they try to be good citizens, he will be able to make them love him, and if they are bad citizens, he can give them better reason to fear him. Moreover, if anyone from outside considers an attack, they will hesitate because a prince living in his possession is more difficult to knock out.

Another good plan for a prince conquering a foreign land is to send colonies of his own citizens into one or two key places in the new province. In fact, if a prince does not do this, he will have to station a large part of his army in the new territory to keep control. The prince will not have to spend much on the colonies. He can send them out and maintain them at little expense. With colonists, the prince will injure only those whose lands he gives to the colonists, and he can pick a few people to injure this way. Since this doesn’t hurt many people, those people are no serious threat. The other inhabitants of the conquered land, who have not been injured, are easy to keep quiet and are also careful not to cause trouble lest their land be taken for colonists as well. So, to sum up: such colonies are inexpensive, they are loyal and they cause little harm, and the injured people being few and scattered can cause no trouble. For, it is to be noted that men must be either treated well or annihilated; for they will seek revenge for small injuries, while for annihilation they cannot. Consequently, if you are going to hurt a man, do it hard and fast so that he cannot take revenge.

If instead of colonies soldiers have to be maintained, it will be expensive. The tax revenue of the conquered land will be taken up supporting the occupying army. In fact, this can get so expensive that the conquered land turns out to be an expense. Besides, army occupation is much more dangerous since it harms the entire conquered state. Since the army inevitable injures people, everyone becomes an enemy of the prince. Such enemies, even though beaten, can cause a lot of trouble since they are on their home ground. In every aspect then, army garrisons are useless and colonies are useful.

Further, a prince who finds himself in possession of this alien sort of province must make himself a leader and defender of his less powerful neighbors. This way, he makes friends. Similarly, he must try to weaken his stronger neighbors to ensure that no prince as powerful as himself gets into the area. If a foreigner gets in, it will always be because he is encouraged by those in the conquered country who are angry or ambitious. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians. Similarly, in every other country where they gained a footing, they were brought in by the inhabitants. The general rule is this: as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the less powerful of that country join him out of envy towards those who ruled them. So, the powerful foreigner has no trouble finding allies. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. A prince who fails to be careful in this matter will soon lose whatever he has won and even when he holds it, he will have infinite trouble and annoyances.

The Romans, in the provinces they took, followed such a course and sent out colonies. They also attracted the support of their less powerful neighbors without making those weak neighbors stronger. Furthermore, they put down the powerful and allowed no strong foreigners to gain prestige. Their dealings in Greece alone are examples enough. They accepted the Acheans and Aetolians as allies, but overthrew the Macedonians and Antiochus. They didn’t bother to take over the Acheans and Aetolians, but they knocked out the competition. The Romans acted in these matters as good princes should. They not only took care of present problems, they solved future ones before they came up. For, if evils are dealt with before they occur, they can be easily remedied. If you wait for the illness to come, the remedy will be too late and sickness will be beyond cure. Politics are like fevers which are easy to cure but hard to recognize. If the illness is diagnosed before it takes hold, and this is a skill possessed only by the careful, the illness can be dealt with. A late diagnosis will leave an illness incurable. So the Romans, foreseeing difficulties still in the distance, always had a remedy for them. They never allowed them to grow in order to avoid a war. For the Romans knew that a war can never be avoided, but only put off to the enemy’s advantage. On this account, they were willing to make war on the Macedonians in Greece rather than having to fight them in Italy. They could have put off the war, but they did not. The Romans had no respect for the idea of “playing for time” which is so popular with the wise men of our times. Instead, the Romans followed their own courage, for time brings all things, bad as well as good.

But to return to France, let us see if she did any of the things we have mentioned. I shall speak of Louis and not Charles for as the former held possessions in Italy for a longer time, his actions can be better studied and you will see that he did just the opposite to what should have been done to preserve and alien acquisition. King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wanted to win half the state of Lombardy by his coming. I do not wish to blame the King for this kind of entry or the role he played because, hoping as he was of getting a foothold in Italy and having no friends in this country - indeed on account of his predecessor’s behavior all doors were closed to him - he was obliged to take what friends he could find. And his plans would have met with speedy success had he made no mistakes in his other actions. Once he had occupied Lombardy, he then regained all the prestige that had been lost be his predecessor Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, and numerous other Italians, came forward to offer him friendship and at that point the Venetians might well have reflected on the rashness of their decision for, just to gain two towns in Lombardy they had made the king the master of two-thirds of Italy. Consider now how easily the King might have maintained his position in Italy if he had followed the rules set forth above. He should have provided safety and protection to his friends who were weak, numerous, and fearful. Some of them were afraid of the Church, and others of the Venetians. They would have stood by Louis, thus easily making him safe against such states as still remained powerful.

Yet, hardly was he Milan when he adopted the reverse course. He assisted Pope Alexander in the occupation of Romagna. Moreover, Louis did not realize that he was weakening himself by angering those who had turned to him for protection and by strengthening the church by adding political power to its spiritual power. Having made one mistake, Louis soon followed it with another when he was forced to bring his army into Italy in order to stop Pope Alexander. Worse still, Louis desire for the Kingdom of Naples led him to split Naples with the King of Spain, thus bringing another competitor into Italy. Thus, those who disliked Louis could now turn to the King of Spain for help.

It is a normal and natural thing to want to acquire possessions. When man who can acquire lands do acquire them, they receive praise and not blame. The problem is when they try to take a land beyond their grasp. That is the blameworthy mistake. If France had been able to conquer Naples with her own forces, she should have done so. If Naples was beyond reach, Louis should have left well enough alone. Louis should not have divided Naples. Even though the splitting of Lombardy was excusable on the grounds of gaining a foothold in Italy, splitting Naples was a mistake. Louis made these five errors: 1) he ruined the less powerful states, 2) he increased the power in Italy of an already strong state, 3) he brought into the country a powerful foreigner, 4) he did not live in the country himself, and 5) he did not plant colonies in Italy.

CHAPTER 4

Why The Kingdom Of Darius, Conquered By Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against The Successors Of Alexander At His Death

Considering the difficulties which men have had holding a newly acquired state, some might wonder how Alexander the Great and his successors did it. This is especially curious seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years and died while it was barely settled. It seems likely that the whole empire would have rebelled, but instead his successors maintained themselves and had no other difficulties than those that arose from their own ambitions.

I answer that principalities are governed in two different ways: either by a prince with a group of his own servants, or by a prince and barons. The barons, unlike the servants, think that they hold their power by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and follow them. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants have more loyalty towards their prince. This is true because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him. If they do obey anyone else, they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear minister or official any particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants. He sends out administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, each of whom has his own loyal subjects. These lords have their own powers, which the king has trouble taking away. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk. But, once Turkey is conquered, it is easy to hold. The difficulty of seizing the kingdom of the Turk is that the invader cannot be called in by the princes of Turkey, nor can he hope for help from a revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This is true for the reasons given above. The Turkish ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty. Moreover, one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find the Turk united. The invader will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others. But, if the Turk has been soundly conquered, there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince. Once the family members have been exterminated, there remains no one to fear. Since the conqueror did not rely on anyone before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The opposite happens in kingdoms governed like that of France. Here one can easily enter by getting help from barons of the kingdom. In any kingdom, there are malcontents and those who desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy. But, if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. It is not enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you. Since you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever the barons get the chance.

Now, if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk. Therefore, it was only necessary for Alexander to overthrow Darius in the field in order to take the country from him. After Darius was killed, the state was firmly in Alexander’s hands. If Alexander’s successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and easily, because there were no trouble raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold states set up like France peacefully. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece. Because there were many principalities in these states, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans could never securely hold them. But with the power and long run of the empire, the memory of the old principalities faded, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there. The family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered, you should not be surprised at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia. Likewise the difficulties which others have had in keeping acquisitions (such as Pyrrhus and many more) is unsurprising. The determining factor is not the lack or abundance of the conqueror’s ability, but is rather the condition of the subject state.

CHAPTER 5

How To Govern Cities Or Principalities Which Lived Under Their Own Laws Before They Were Conquered

Whenever conquered states are used to living under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: (1) the first is to ruin them, (2) the next is to live there in person, (3) the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, tax them, and set up a friendly oligarchy within them. Because such an imposed government knows that it cannot survive without the prince’s support, the imposed government does what the prince wants. With this help, it is easier for a prince to hold such a city by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes and established a friendly oligarchy there, but Sparta lost them anyway. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. Likewise, the Romans wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting it its own laws, but they did not succeed. So to hold it, the Romans were forced to dismantle many cities in the country. They did this because there was no other way to hold them other than by ruining them. Essentially, he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it. Rebellion is always caused by the memory of liberty as a rallying point. No matter how much time passes, or how much the prince benefits the conquered city, the citizens do not forget their past freedom. And what ever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed. At every chance they immediately rally to thir past liberty, as Pisa did after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.

On the other hand, when cities or countries are accustomed to living under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they are easy to hold. For one thing, they are accustomed to obedience and cannot agree on who should replace the dead prince. They also do not know how to govern themselves without a prince. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can conquer them and secure them much more easily. But, in republics there is more spirit, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest. Consequently, the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.