CHAPTER 16

Concerning Generosity and Stinginess

Concerning generosity and stinginess, I say that it is best to be considered generous. Nevertheless, generosity will injure you if no one knows that you are doing it. If you are generous in the proper honest way, people may not know that you are doing it. If the people do not notice, then you will be accused of stinginess. Therefore, anyone who wants to be known as generous should avoid gaining great power or station. A prince who wants to be generous will have to spend all of his money and even tax his people to get the money with which to be generous. This will soon make him hated by his subjects, and he will become poor and lose the respect of his subjects. Thus, the prince’s generosity will have hurt many people and rewarded few people. The prince is then ruined by the very first trouble or danger; recognizing this himself. If the prince tries to draw back from generosity, he will be accused of miserliness.

Since a prince can never be generous in a way that the people will see, except to hurt him, he should not fear having a reputation for miserliness. In time, he will be better respected than if he were generous. This is because his cheapness will ensure that his income will be sufficient to defend himself and do what he requires without having to over-tax his people. Consequently, by being stingy, he actually is generous towards his people since he takes little from his numberless subjects. He is only miserly towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

The only people to have done great things in our time are those who have been considered stingy. The rest have failed. Pope Julius II was assisted in becoming Pope by a reputation for generosity, yet he soon gave up this reputation. When he made war on the King of France, and during his other wars, he did not impose any extraordinary taxes on his subjects. Instead, he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. Similarly, the present King of Spain would not have been so successful in his conquests and enterprises if he had had a reputation for generosity. Therefore, as long as a prince can maintain himself in decent status without overtaxing his subjects, he should not worry about a reputation for miserliness. Indeed, miserliness is one of those vices which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained power through generosity, and many others have reached the highest positions through generosity, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this generosity is dangerous; in the second it is very necessary to be considered generous. Caesar wanted to rule Rome, but if he had survived after becoming so without cutting back his expenses, he would have destroyed his own government. And if any one should reply: Many princes with a reputation for generosity have done great things with armies, I reply: Either a prince spends his own money, his subjects' or else someone else’s. When spending his own money, he ought to be sparing. When spending his subjects’ money he should be as generous as possible. Along similar lines, when a prince uses his army, he should allow his troops to pillage, sack, and extort, and steal. This generosity is necessary since otherwise he would not be followed by his soldiers. In the case of spending money that is neither yours nor your subjects', you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander. This is because it does not take away your reputation if you squander other people’s money. Indeed, it adds to it. It is only squandering your own money that injures you.

There is nothing that drains a prince so quickly as generosity, because even as you do it you lose the power to continue. In the end the prince becomes either poor or despised. Otherwise, if he tries to stop and avoid poverty, his is seen as rapacious and is hated. Obviously, a prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated. Generosity leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for miserliness, which makes people think less of you without making them hate you, than to be forced to make you subjects hate you through overtaxing them as you seek a reputation for generosity.

CHAPTER 17

Concerning Cruelty And Mercy, And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared

Now I can speak about the qualities I mentioned above. I say that every prince should want to be considered merciful and not cruel. Nevertheless, he should take care not to misuse this mercy. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, but his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if one looks at it correctly, Cesare was obviously much more merciful than the Florentines. The Florentines, in order to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, should not mind the brand of cruelty. By making only a few examples of people, he will be more merciful than those who are overly merciful and allow disorders to arise. Too much mercy can lead to murders or robberies. Crime injures the entire population, while the prince’s execution offend only the dead individual.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid being called cruel since new states are full of dangers. Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new, saying:

Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.

[…my cruel fate, and doubts arising from an unsettled state force me to guard my coast from foreign foes.]

Nevertheless, a new prince should be slow to believe and to act. Neither should he himself show fear. Instead, he should act in a calm manner with prudence and humanity. That way, too much confidence will not make him incautious and too much distrust will not make him intolerable.

A question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both. But, because it is difficult for one person to be both, it is much safer to be feared than loved when one must choose. It can generally be said of men that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, and greedy. As long as you succeed, they are yours entirely. They will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant. But, when trouble approaches, they turn against you. Any prince who relies entirely on their promises and has neglected other precautions is ruined. Essentially, friendships made by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured. In time of need, these friendships cannot be relied upon. Moreover, men have less guilt about offending one who is beloved than one who is feared. This is because love is preserved by a link made weak by the low and mean character of men. At every opportunity, love is abandoned to gain advantage. On the other hand, fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred. A prince can endure for a long time being feared as long as he is not hated. It is easy to avoid hatred as long as the prince keeps his hands off the property and women of his citizens and subjects. However, when it is necessary for him to move against the life of someone, he must do it with proper justification and for obvious reasons. But, above all things, he must keep his hands off the property of others. Men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance. Dangerously, there are always convenient reasons for seizing property, and once you start robbing the people, it is difficult to stop. On the other hand, reasons to taking life are fewer and farther between. The only exception to the above rule is when a prince is with his army and has under control a large number of soldiers. Then, it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or ready to do its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is listed: that having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in foreign lands, no quarrels arose either among them or against the prince, whether or not things were going well for him. This arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valor, made him respected and feared by his soldiers. Without that cruelty, his other virtues would not have been enough to produce this effect. And shortsighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn their main cause. That it is true his other virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio. That most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man, faced a rebellion of his army in Spain. This came about from his being too kind and loose, which gave his soldiers more freedom than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was criticized in the Senate by Fabius Maximus. Scipio was called the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him. Nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to Scipio’s easy nature. Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not to make mistakes than to correct the errors of others. Scipio’s habits, if they had been continued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio. But because he was under the control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the conclusion that: men love for their own reasons and fear for the reasons of the prince. A wise prince should base his power on that which is in his own control and not in that of others. Still, he must make sure to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER 18

Concerning The Way In Which Princes Should Keep Faith

Everyone admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live honestly and not sneakily. Nevertheless, our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have now worried about good faith. They have known how to trick the minds of men, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of competing: by the law and by force. The first method is proper to men, the second to beasts. But, because the first is often not enough, it is necessary to use the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to use both the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse. Chiron brought them up in his discipline. This can only mean that it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both human and beastly natures since their teacher was a mix of man and horse. One part without the other is not durable. Since a prince must adopt a beastly nature, he should choose the fox and the lion. I say the two because the lion cannot defend himself against traps and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the traps and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot and should not keep faith when being honest may be turned against him or when the reasons behind his promise no longer exist. If men were entirely good this law would not hold, but because they are bad and untrustworthy, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Moreover, a prince will always have good reasons to break his promises. There are endless modern examples showing treaties and engagements invalidated through the faithlessness of princes. He who has known best how to be the fox has succeeded best.

Still, one must know how to disguise dishonestly. Men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Pope Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men. Indeed, he never thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims. There never was a man who had greater power in claiming to speak plainly or in making oaths, yet who was more dishonest. Nevertheless, Alexander’s deceits always worked, because he well understood this side of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have listed, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful. A prince should appear to be merciful, faithful, humane, religious, and upright. Indeed, he should be those things. But, he should do so in such a frame of mind so that he is able to change to the opposite and knows when to do so.

You must understand this: a prince, especially a new one, cannot follow the good path, since he is often forced by circumstance of state, to act against faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore, it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself as the winds and changes of fortune force it. Yet, as I have said above, a prince should not leave the good if he can avoid doing so. But, if forced, then he should know how to set about it.

For this reason a prince should to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not colored by the above-named five qualities. That way, he will appear to those who see and hear him as altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary than to appear to have than this last quality, religion. This is because men generally judge more by the eye than by the hand. Everybody can see you, but few come in close contact with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are. More importantly, those few do not dare to oppose the majority opinion and power of the state. In the actions of all men, and especially of princes where there is no court of appeal, the end result is all that counts.

For that reason, if a prince is known for conquering and holding his state, he will always be considered honest and be praised by everybody. The common people believe in surface appearances and results. And in the world there is only the mass, for the few find their place only when the majority have no base of support.

One prince of the present time [Ferdinand of Spain], whom it is not wise to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith. Yet, he is most hostile to both ideas and either, if he had worked for them, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.

CHAPTER 19

That One Should Avoid Being Despised And Hated

I have already discussed the most important characteristics I mentioned above, but I wish to discuss briefly a specific point. That is to say that the prince must consider, as I touched on before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible. If he succeeds in doing that, he will have done his job, and he need not fear any accusations that might be leveled at him.

The quickest way for a prince to earn hatred, as I have said, is to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects. He must abstain from both. Since the majority of men live content when their property and honor are untouched, the prince need only worry about the ambition of a few, whom he can sideline with ease in many ways.

The things which make a prince contemptible, and against which he must carefully guard himself, is to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, or irresolute. Moreover, he should try to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude. In his private dealings with his subjects, the prince should make it clear that his judgments are irrevocable. He must build up such a reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him. If the prince can convey this impression of himself, he will be highly esteemed. Importantly, he who is highly esteemed is not easily plotted against. As long as it is well known that he is an excellent man and respected by his people, a prince can be attacked only with difficulty.

For this reason, a prince should have two fears: one from within, on account of his subjects; the other from outside, on account of external powers. From external enemies, he is defended by being well armed and having good allies. Indeed, if he is well armed, he will have good friends. As a result of this good planning the internal affairs of his realm will always remain quiet when there are no external threats. The only exception is when the prince is confronted with a conspiracy. Even if external affairs become disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said and does not panic, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

In the specific case of his subjects when external affairs are disturbed, the prince’s only fear is that they will conspire against him secretly. However, this is easily avoided if the prince is neither hated nor despised, and if he keeps the people satisfied with him (this is crucial). Probably the most efficient remedy that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people. This is because anyone who conspires against a prince always expects to please the people by knocking him off. However, when the conspirator knows that he will offend the people, he will not have the courage to take such a course. The difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And, as experience shows, there have been many conspiracies, but few have been successful. This is because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he any allies other than other malcontents. This causes problems for the conspirator because as soon as he has explained his plans to another plotter, he has laid himself open being ratted out. The person brought in can clear benefits from squealing, while the possibility that the plot will work are not so clear. As a result, the person brought into the plot must be a very rare friend, or a committed enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. Summing all of this up, I say that the conspirator has nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him. The prince, on the other hand, has all the support of his majesty, the laws, the protection of friends, and the state to defend him. If you add popular support to all these things, it is impossible that any one should be so foolhardy as to conspire. In general, the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot. When the people support the prince, the plotter has also to fear a positive result of the crime because the people will be his enemy. Thus, he cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but the child Messer Giovanni. Immediately after Annibale’s assassination, the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in Bologna. The people’s love for the Bentivoglio was so great that, although there were no remaining Bentivoglios in Bologna after the death of Annibale who were able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivoglio family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city. And it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni was old enough to take over the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem. But when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France. In it are found many good institutions that protect the liberty and security of the king. Of these the first is the parliament and its authority. This is because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths [like that used to control horses] would be necessary to hold them in. And, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them. Yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king. Therefore, to take away the disfavor which he would be liable to get from the nobles for siding with the people, and from the people for defending the nobles, he set up a referee, who should be one who could beat down the great and favor the lesser without causing disfavor towards the king. One could not have a better or a more careful arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion: that princes ought to leave affairs of punishment to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion. This is because some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul and yet nevertheless they lost their empires or were killed by subjects who conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors. I will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me. At the same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me that it will do to look at those emperors who ruled from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus. They were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

First, while in other principalities rulers have to deal with only the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and greed of their soldiers. This was a matter so difficult that it was the ruin of many because it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people. The people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the prince who didn’t want to grow the empire. The soldiers, on the other hand, loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious. It was these qualities that the soldiers were quite willing he should use upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. As a result, those emperors who, either by birth or training, had no great authority were always overthrown. Most of these emperors, especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing issues, tended to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. This course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one. When they cannot pull this off, they ought to try hard to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, inexperienced emperors more readily sided with the soldiers than with the people. This course turned out advantageous to the emperors if they knew how to maintain authority over the soldiers, but failed otherwise.

From these sort of circumstances it came to be that Marcus [Aurelius], Pertinax, and Alexander, who were all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus. He alone lived and died honored, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people. And, afterwards, because he had many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both soldiers and citizens in their places while he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

In contrast, Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being used to living rich and easy under Commodus, could not endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them. Thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones. Therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil. For when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself- it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles- you have to submit to its humors and to satisfy them, and then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are said of him is that in the fourteen years he held was emperor no one was ever put to death unless he had judged it appropriate. Nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he came to be despised. The army conspired against him and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious - men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of unjust acts against the people. All of them, except Severus, came to a bad end. But in Severus there was so much valor that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned successfully. His valor made him so admired by his soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion. As I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate both.

Knowing the laziness of the Emperor Julian, Severus persuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian soldiers. Under this pretext, without appearing to want the throne, Severus moved the army on Rome. He reached Italy before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties. One was in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor. The other difficulty was in the west where Albinus also aspired to be emperor. Since Severus considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both rivals, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar. Severus also said that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague. These things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled the eastern affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus was a traitor who wanted to murder him. Severus said that because of this threat, he was compelled to punish Albinus. Afterwards Severus sought Albinus out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of Severus will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox. The examiner will find Severus feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army. It shouldn’t be a surprise that Severus succeeded because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence.

However, his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities. These qualities made the people admire him and made him acceptable to the soldiers. He was a warlike man, blessed with endurance, who hated all delicate food and other luxuries. That caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them. But a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare. He only has to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care. Instead he had killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard. This, it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers. Yet, because he was by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon the people. On the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, he often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators. He also did other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty. He fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised. One thing was the fact that he hated started life as a shepherd from Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one). The other thing that caused him problems was that when he became emperor he did not go immediately to Rome and take possession of the imperial throne. He had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practiced many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the low class of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome. Soon all Italy conspired against him, to which may be added his own army. His army went against him because, besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, they were disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out. But I will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times face less difficulty if they don’t keep their soldiers satisfied. It is easier now to keep an army satisfied now. Also, none of today’s princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire were. So, while in the past it was necessary to give more satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Sultan, to satisfy the people more than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which he can depend. So, it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The kingdom of the Sultan is similar because it is entirely in the hands of soldiers. It follows again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Sultan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principality. This is because the sons of the Pope are not heirs. Instead he who is elected Pope by the Cardinals has authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. Since this is an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones. For although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is old. It is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors. Furthermore, it should be obvious that a number of these emperors acted in one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality. Likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, because they didn’t have sufficient valor to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus. Neither is it necessary to follow those of Severus. So the aspiring Prince should take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm.

CHAPTER 20

Are Fortresses, And Many Other Things To Which Princes Often Turn, Useful Or Hurtful?

Some princes, in order to hold their state securely, have disarmed their subjects. Others have held their subject towns through the support of local powerful groups. Some have made enemies in order to defeat those enemies and build up their own power. Still others have made friends of their original enemies. Some princes have built fortresses, while others tore down their fortresses. And although the specific situations of the states involved are crucial in judging the decision that was made, nevertheless I will speak on each subject as much as is possible.

No new prince has ever disarmed his subjects. Instead, some new princes have armed their disarmed subjects. This is useful because armed citizens become your armies. Those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so. Essentially, your subjects become your supporters. And while all subjects cannot be armed, still those whom you do arm are benefited. As a result, the other citizens can be handled more freely, despite this difference in their treatment, because the people understand your actions. The ones who benefit become your dependents, while the others understand the necessity that those who have the most danger and service [the army] should have the most reward and excuse you. But, when you disarm the people, you offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for lack of loyalty. Whichever thing they think, these opinions breed hatred against you. Moreover, since you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you have to turn to mercenaries, who will ruin you as I explained before. Even if the mercenaries turn out to be good they would not be enough to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms. History is full of examples.

The only exception to the above rule is when a prince acquires a new state and adds it as a province to his old one. Then it is necessary to disarm the men of the conquered state. The only people who can keep their arms are those who helped the prince in acquiring it. As time and opportunity allow, these still-armed people should be turned soft and effeminate. You should arrange it so that the only armed men in the conquered state are your own soldiers whom you trust.

Our forefathers and wise men, often said that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses. Using this idea, they sparked quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may have worked well enough when Italy had a balance of power, but I do not believe it works any longer. I do not believe that factions can ever be of use. In fact, when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest faction will always help the outside forces while the other faction will not be able to hold out. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities. And although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a strong and lively principality. Such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves to be an error.

There is a specific strategy for princes to become great after difficulties and obstacles (and also luck obviously). This strategy is particularly useful for hereditary princes who need to build up a reputation of their own. The strategy is to cause enemies to arise and plot against him. This way, the prince will have the opportunity of beating them. Through his victory, he will rise higher; his enemies will serve as a ladder. For this reason, a wise prince should make specific people hate him when he has the opportunity. When he has crushed his enemies, his reputation may rise higher.

Curiously, princes, especially new ones, have found more loyalty and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those whom the prince could trust in the beginning. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those whom he had distrusted than by others. But, on this question one cannot speak generally. The situation varies so much with each individual prince. I will only say this: those men who were hostile at the outset of a princedom can be turned into allies quite easily if they themselves need the prince’s. What is more, they will serve the prince loyally since they know that they have to make him their friend by proving that they are worthy of support. Thus, the prince will always be better served by these people than by those who don’t need anything from him. Since these others do not need the security that the prince can supply, they may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince who gained a new state through secret favors, that he must seriously consider why he was given such a gift. If the reason was not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then the prince will have great trouble keeping them friendly. Indeed, it will be impossible to satisfy them. If we consider ancient and modern examples, we find that it is easier for the prince to make friends with those men who were contented under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than with those who were discontented with the previous state and who encouraged him to seize it.

In the past, princes have built fortresses in order to hold their states more securely. These fortresses were designed to give those who might attack a prince something to chew on and also to serve as a place of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has long been used. Despite this historical success, Messer Nicolo Vitelli, in our times, decided to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello in order keep that state. Likewise, Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to the lands out of which he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, destroyed all the fortresses in that province. Guidubaldo felt that it would be more difficult to lose his lands again without the fortresses. The Bentivoglio came to a similar decision when they returned to Bologna. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances. If they do you good in one way they injure you in another. The reason is as follows: the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build fortresses. On the other hand, he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people doesn’t need fortresses. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason, the best possible fortress is not to be hated by the people. You may hold the fortresses, but they will not save you if the people hate you. There will always be foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. In no recent situation have fortresses have been of use to any prince, except perhaps to the Countess of Forli, when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed. The fortress did allow her to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state. Also, the way things were arranged at that time foreigners could not assist the people. However, fortresses were of little value to her later on, when Cesare Borgia attacked her. Then the people were her enemy and allied with foreigners. Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not. However, I will blame any prince who cares so much about fortresses that he cares little about being hated by the people.

Chapter 21

What a Prince Needs to do in Order to Make a Good Reputation

Nothing earns a prince so much respect as great actions and setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen by fame and glory from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in the Christian world.

If you consider Ferdinand’s deeds, you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign, he attacked Granada. This action was the foundation of his expanded kingdom. He worked quietly at first and without any fear of stumbling since he had control over the barons of Castile. He kept them occupied in thinking of war and not of challenging his rule. As a result, they did not realize that, by his actions, he was acquiring power and authority over them. With the help of the money of the Church and of the people, Ferdinand was able to sustain his armies. And, as a result of that long war, he laid the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, he has always used religion as an excuse to undertake greater schemes. With pious cruelty, he succeeded in driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors. In fact, there could not be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak of religion, he attacked Africa, then he came down on Italy, and finally he has attacked France. Thus, his achievements and plans have always been great. He has kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with his wars. Indeed his actions have come one after the other, so that men have never been given time to work steadily against him.

Again, it is very useful for a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs similar to those of Messer Bernabo da Milano. This man, when he had the opportunity, would choose a citizen who had just done something very good or very bad and would reward or punish him in such a way that everyone spoke about it. Above all things, Messer Bernabo da Milano always worked to build up a reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy. In other words, he should make it very clear which side he is on in any conflict. This course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral. For example, imagine that two of your powerful neighbors come to blows. Nations are of variable strength, and if one of them wins, you will either have to fear him or not. In either case, it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenuously. If you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror. You will get no help from him who has been conquered because you will have no excuses to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Indeed, conquerors do not want doubtful friends who will not come to their aid when they needs it. He who loses will not defend you because you made no effort to support him. Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." In any situation such as this, the person who is not your friend will demand your neutrality. At the same time, he who is your friend will beg you to join the fighting. Weak princes who want to avoid immediate dangers generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But, when a prince declares himself bravely in favor of one side he will do well if his ally wins. Even though the victorious ally may be powerful and may have the prince at his mercy, still, the victor owes the prince. A bond of friendship has been established, and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories, after all, are never so complete that the victor can afford to deny the prince just treatment. Even if the prince’s ally loses, the prince can expect support from the defeated ally. While the ally is able, he will support the prince and there is also always the chance that the winds of fortune will eventually shift in the prince and his ally’s favor.

In the second case, when the contestants in a fight are such that you have no fears about who will win, you should definitely be allied. Since you helped the person who won, that person will fall under your power. If he had been wise, the victor would have saved his enemy, because, by conquering with your assistance, he has put himself in your hands. I should note here that a prince should be careful never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others unless it is absolutely necessary. If your powerful ally conquers, you are under his power. Princes should avoid as much as possible being under anyone else’s power. The Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan. This alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince ought to favor one of the parties for the reasons I mentioned previously.

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses. Rather, let it expect to have to take very doubtful courses. In ordinary affairs, one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into another. Careful action consists in knowing how to choose your troubles, and choosing the lesser evil.

A prince should show himself to be a lover of virtue and should encourage those who have skills in every art. At the same time, he should make commerce, agriculture, and other businesses safe and reliable occupations. That way, no one will be kept from improving their possessions for fear that their work will be stolen from them or that taxes will impoverish them. A prince should take care to reward his citizens who can in any way enrich his state or city. Furthermore, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year. And, since every city is divided into guilds or societies, he should respect these associations and meet with them sometimes. He should build up a reputation for courtesy and generosity. Nevertheless, he must always maintain the majesty of his rank, for this he must never allow to be weakened.